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Abstract
SecureMDD is a model-driven approach to develop security-critical
systems. It uses a model that represents an application and generates
executable code as well as a formal specification that can be used to prove
security properties. In our previous works we considered secure smart
card application and now we focus on secure service applications. In
this report we describe the modelling of services, their communication
and their security. We also show the generated code and explain the
integration of services in the formal model. To demonstrate our approach
we show a banking system which uses smart cards and services.
1 Introduction
The worldwide enterprise software revenue in 2011 is estimated to $267 Billion
[8], but only 32% of all software projects were successful [9]. The reasons for
the failure of a software project vary, but often lack of time and complexity
are important issues. Model-driven software development that uses a model to
create a software system can make the development process faster and easier.
For that, a model will be created that enables a high abstraction of the system.
The implementation can be generated automatically or semi-automatically from
this model. Furthermore, during the build, documents that record the states of
the development will be created. Especially the development of security-critical
systems is very difficult and error-prone. With the model-driven approach the
model of the system is available and with correct transformations it is ensured
that the model is equivalent to the generated code. Based on this fact it is
possible to verify properties for the model that are also valid for the imple-
mentation. Therefore developing security-critical software with a model-driven
approach has large potential.
Our project SecureMDD is an approach for developing security-critical sys-
tems with UML. From a model that represents an application, executable code
as well as a formal specification which is used to prove security properties is gen-
erated. Especially applications that store or transmit sensitive data like money
require verification to prove their security. We focus on applications which in-
teract with humans and handle security critical data. Some of our case studies
are business applications but we are not restricted to this area of application.
Until now we considered only security critical smart card applications. In
this report we present how security critical service applications have to be han-
dled in a model driven approach. Services differ a lot from smart cards because
of the different communication abilities, the different behaviour and the differ-
ent operational areas. For developing security critical service applications in a
model driven approach it has to be clarified how services, their communication
and their security are integrated in the model, generated code and formal spec-
ification. In detail, it has to be determined how to handle concurrent service
invokes and how to support sessions for state based protocols. Also, it has to be
worked out how to secure transferred messages between any possible communi-
cation participants, store complex data and how to generate executable service
code.
This report is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of our
SecureMDD approach and section 3 describes the modelling of services. Section
4 introduces the application example Debitcard which illustrates a bank system
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application where the customers of different banks own a card to withdraw
money from an ATM or transfer money from their accounts to others. Section
5 explains the generated code as well as the deployment. Section 6 explains the
effects of services and their secure communication on the formal specification
and gives an overview of proved application-specific security properties. Section
7 discusses related work and Section 8 concludes this paper.
2 The SecureMDD Approach
SecureMDD is a model-driven approach to develop security critical systems.
Based on a model that represents a system, runnable code and a formal specifi-
cation can be generated. The formal specification is used to verify application-
specific security properties which the system has to satisfy. For example it could
be required that a system or a part of it does not lose money, that security crit-
ical data will remain secret or that a Dolev-Yao [7] attacker cannot harm the
system.
Figure 1: SecureMDD Ap-
proach
The SecureMDD approach (see Figure 1) uses
a platform independent UML model and a UML
profile as well as a platform independent and easy
to use modelling language MEL [18] to define security-
critical applications. For representing the sys-
tem we use class diagrams, activity diagrams, se-
quence diagrams and a deployment diagram.
The class diagrams are used to describe the
static part of the system and define classes with
attributes and methods which can be used with
stereotypes from our UML profile. These classes
represent transferred messages or components like
smart cards, terminals and services. The activity diagrams are used for the dy-
namic behavior and describe the cryptographic protocols with components and
their messages as well as their behavior after receiving a message. The sequence
diagrams represent a higher abstraction of the dynamic behavior and the de-
ployment diagram is used to describe the communication structure, attacker
abilities and connection security.
Based on the platform independent application model, a formal specification
and three platform specific models – one for each component type – will be
generated. The formal specification is the basis for the verification of security
properties that can be proved with the theorem prover KIV [1]. The platform
specific models are tailored to their target platforms, Java Card for a smart
card component, Java for a terminal, and Java based Web services for a service
component.
We define a smart card as an component that can be accessed only via a
predefined interface and is tamper-proof: nobody has access to the operating
system or the internal memory directly. A terminal can be a secure automaton,
a personal computer, or a mobile device that receives instructions from a user
and can have an interface for the communication with a smart card. A service
is a component that can be connected with terminals or other services over a
network. Each service describes an interface and an application that runs on a
server which can be only accessed via its interfaces.
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For further processing of the application model we use the development
environment Eclipse1. The formal specification is generated with the framework
oAW2 and the three platform specific models are created automatically using
model-to-model (M2M) transformations with QVT [21]. Model-to-text (M2T)
transformations based on oAW are used to generate the executable code. Each
PSM is transformed to one or more Java packages that contains the full source
code for each component type. The language for terminals and services is Java,
while smart card code uses Java Card [24, 4], a version of Java tailored for smart
cards with their severe resource limitations.
More details about our approach and applications modelled with SecureMDD
can be found in [18, 16, 17].
3 Modelling of Services
A service is identified by the stereotypeService and can be stateful or state-
less which is represented by the same-named stereotype properties (stateless is
default). Stateless means that all invokers communicate with the same service
instance. Stateful means that someone who invokes a stateful service for the
first time opens a session and gets a new instance, and after the work is done
the service can close the session. In this session the invoker communicates with
the new service instance, which can store session dependent information like
session keys. But for protocols which do not have to store session dependent
information, we provide stateless services. Those stereotypes can be applied to
classes in a class diagram and nodes in a deployment diagram. A class describes
the static part of a component. With nodes and the intermediate connections
the communication structure is defined. For every component one class and one
node with the same name and the same stereotypes have to exist.
Activity diagrams describe the behaviour of the components. They use
swimlanes to define the behaviour for a certain component. Every swimlane
is associated with a class that describes a component. One activity diagram de-
fines one protocol for component instances that exchange messages with other
component instances. To communicate with a stateful service, at the beginning
a session has to be opened and at the end the session should be closed. For
that the stereotypes openSession and closeSession have to be applied
to the UML actions send signal action respectively receive event action. When
openSession is applied to a send signal action, a new session will be opened
before the message is sent and after receiving a message with a receive event
action, with the applied closeSession stereotype the session will be closed.
Because it is ambiguous where a session should start and where it should end
it is necessary to model that information.
To model communication of service applications we use activity- and deploy-
ment diagrams. The orchestration of a service is described through the swim-
lanes which represent this service. Choreography is not modelled separately.
It is described with all messages that are represented with arrows between two
swimlanes. But each protocol is modelled as one activity diagram and so all
messages for each protocol are clearly represented.
1http://www.eclipse.org/
2openArchitectureWare: http://www.openarchitectureware.org/
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A service can be invoked by terminals and services and is able to invoke
other services. That make it possible to model complex service hierarchies and
realize a service oriented system. But a service is also able to communicate with
a smart card over an intermediate terminal.
For securing the communication between an invoker and a service we sup-
port Transport Layer Security (TLS). TLS will be modelled as the stereotype
TLS that is applied to a connection in the deployment diagram and it sup-
ports the properties MutualAuthentication and ServerSideAuthentication. The
implementation uses a Java library so we do not verify this protocol but use
assumptions like confidentiality and integrity during the verification of the mod-
elled system (see Section 6). Besides TLS we also support special security data
types for encrypted, signed or hashed message parts as well as for keys and other
data types. Those security data types are not part of a standard because Web
Services and Java Card do not support a common standard.
4 Debitcard: A Bank System Application
Debitcard is a system where a card holder who knows the PIN of his card can
withdraw money from an ATM or use a PC with internet connection to transfer
money from one account to another. The application consists of two kinds of
banks: an affiliated bank with multiple ATMs and a direct bank that can only
be reached via a network, e.g. the internet or an ATM of an affiliated bank.
Figure 2: Communication structure of the
Debitcard application
Figure 2 shows the deployment di-
agram that describes the communica-
tion structure, attacker abilities and
connection security. There are four
component types:
Terminal, Smartcard, Service and
User, whereby the User represents a
real person. Furthermore an attacker
represented by the Threat stereotype
can be applied to any connection. He
can be a full Dolev-Yao attacker who
is able to read, send, and suppress
messages on the fly, but he can also
have only a subset of these abilities.
The communication structure is de-
fined with components and interme-
diate connections which can be unidirectional or bidirectional. The connection
between User and ATM as well as between ATM and Debitcard is unidirec-
tional. This means that every action is triggered by the User; only an ATM
that has received an instruction from the User will send a message to Debit-
card ; afterwards the card can answer, but it cannot send messages of its own
accord. In contrast, the connection between DirectBank and AffiliatedBank is
bidirectional; this means that any of them can start a communication with the
other if it has received a message from an ATM or an OnlinebankingService.
The attacker’s abilities and connection security influence each other. If a
connection has no applied Threat stereotype like the connection between User
and ATM or ATM and Debitcard then the connection is assumed to be secure
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(which must be achieved by physical means). Otherwise, if a connection has an
applied Threat stereotype with any ability, the connection can be secured
by security properties like TLS with the default property MutualAuthenti-
cation. As an example we consider the connection between OnlinebankingService
and AffiliatedBank that has a Threat stereotype with the properties read,
send, suppress. That means that the attacker can read, send and suppress
messages on this connection. In combination with TLS it means that the
attacker can only read encrypted messages, and that the properties send as well
as suppress imply that the attacker can disconnect the connection (see Section
6). The assumption for the connection between DirectBank and AffiliatedBank
is that the attacker can only read messages. Thus the attacker is not able to
affect the connection or the transmitted messages (see Section 6).
Now we focus on services that can be stateful or stateless. Onlinebanking-
Service is stateful. It has session dependent information like a protocol state and
session key for every invoker. This way we are able to secure messages between
Debitcard and OnlinebankingService with an application specific cryptographic
protocol that uses PC only as an intermediate. The other services (Affiliated-
Bank and DirectBank) do not need to store session dependent information and
thus it is sufficient that they are stateless.
Figure 3: Class diagram of Debitcard
In Figure 3 a class diagram of Debitcard is illustrated. The classes describe
the static part of the components from the deployment diagram (see Figure 2)
and their attributes. There are some stereotypes that are applied to classes or
attributes.
1. Service, Terminal, Smartcard : describe the component type
2. Initialize: means that this attribute has to be set during the deployment
3. status: can be applied to enumeration attributes and represent component
states in a protocol
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4. sign: can be applied on attributes with the type SignData and describe
that this attribute is signed
5. key : is only legal in combination with a star association and causes that
all elements in this set have a unique key element and can be identified
through this one
There are also some predefined security data types that are necessary for devel-
oping security protocols in secure applications.
1. PublicKey and PrivateKey : public and private key for asymmetric encryp-
tion or signing data
2. SymmKey : a key for symmetric encryption
3. Secret : information that the attacker should never know
4. Nonce: an arbitrary number used only once to sign a cryptographic com-
munication
The OnlinebankingService and the Debitcard employ cryptographic keys,
states, nonces and a certificate to establish a secure communication between each
other. Additionally, the Debitcard contains account information of an account
owner who should be the owner of the card. The two components AffiliatedBank
and DirectBank have an initial bank code and a list of accounts. They have no
keys, states or nonces because their communication can be secured with an
externally applied TLS protocol. The terminal PC has no attributes because it
only forwards the messages between OnlinebankingService and Debitcard. An
ATM needs to temporarily store the PIN and the money that an account owner
try to withdraw. But it also needs to store how much money it has ever paid
out. This information is important for the formal verification of the security
property ’the money in the bank system remains constant’. All components
need messages to interact with each other. For that each component has an
association to the abstract message class Message form which all messages are
derived.
The dynamic part of the system is described with activity diagrams. For
sending and receiving messages we use send signal actions and accept event
actions. To represent exceptions we use final flows and to describe actions like
method calls or assignments we use actions that can also be used in structured
activity nodes. For calling methods that are modelled in a subdiagram we use
call behaviour actions. All described elements are standard elements of activity
diagrams in UML 2.0. In guards, send signal actions, call behaviour actions
and actions we use our abstract and platform independent Model Extension
Language to describe behaviour.
The activity diagram for withdrawal of money from an ATM is pictured in
Figure 4 and the message classes are shown in Figure 10 and Figure 9. First
an AccountOwner who represents the card holder has to insert his card into an
ATM slot and enter his PIN as well as the sum of money on the user interface of
the ATM (1). The ATM stores this information in its attribute userTransInfo,
asks the Debitcard for the account information (2) and sends all data to the
AffiliatedBank (3). The bank first checks if the account belongs to itself or
another bank by comparing the received bank code with its own one. If the
7
Figure 4: Protocol to withdraw money from an ATM
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account belongs to the bank itself it will call the debitFunction (4) and then
depending on the return value the money will be issued or not. But if it does
not belong to this bank but to the DirectBank, the message will be forwarded
to the DirectBank (5) and the amount will be debited there. After that, if the
debit action was successful, a message will be sent back (6)(7) and the ATM
will pay out the money (8).
Figure 5: Sub-Activity debitFunction
In Figure 5 the sub-activity debitFunction is modelled. This functional-
ity is defined for the upper class Bank and can be used from all sub classes.
The bank receives the account information accountInfo (name, account num-
ber, bank code) and the user transaction information uti (PIN, money). Then
it checks if the received bank code is equal to its own and if an account with
the received account number exists. If the check was positive, a copy from the
account will be took from the list of accounts and checked if the name and the
PIN from the account are equal with the received data and if money is not
negative. If this check is also positive the account balance will be decreased by
money and the new account balance is checked to be not smaller than the dispo
value. After the check, the account is updated by setting the account to the
accounts list and true is returned. If one of the checks is negative, the return
value will be false.
Another functionality supported by our example application Debitcard is the
online transaction. Before the online transaction can be invoked, a handshake
has to be processed.
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Figure 6: Handshake Protocol
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In Figure 6 the handshake protocol is shown. It establishes a secure session
between Debitcard and OnlinebankingService. This protocol uses security data
types defined in SecureMDD to secure the messages. We use private and public
keys as well as nonces and states to exchange a session key to secure messages
over an intermediate like in this example the PC component. There are four
participants involved in this scenario. The AccountOwner ao, the PC pc, the
Debicard card and the OnlinebankingService obs. First the message UHandshake
is sent over the pc to card (1). Then if the state is IDLE, a fresh nonce will be
created, wrapped in the class ClientHelloMsg and encrypted with the public key
publicKeyOBS. Then the state will be changed and the encrypted nonce together
with a certificate, consisting of the signature of the card’s public key and the
card’s public key self, will be sent over pc to obs (2). But before pc can forward
this message, it is necessary to know which instance of OnlinebankingService
should be used. Because obs has to store session dependent information like
states and the exchanged session key it is not possible to use the same instance
for all invokers. For that OnlinebankingService is stateful and provides a new
instance for every invoker. Because the same instance should also be used in
another protocols, it is necessary to model the first call of a stateful service.
Therefore the stereotype openSession is supported and can be applied to a
send signal action. Now card communicates with its own OnlinebankingService
instance obs. After obs receives the message, it also checks if its state is IDLE
and verifies the received certificate. If the the certificate is valid (3), obs decrypts
the received nonce, creates another one, wraps the two nonces in the class
ServerHelloMsg and encrypts it with the received public key. After that, the
state will be changed and the encrypted nonces are sent to card (4). card checks
the state and ensures that the last received message was Handshake and that
no exception occurred. It encrypts the received nonces and checks that the first
nonce is equal to the nonce that was generated in the previous card step (5). If
the comparison was successful, the card creates a session key, stores it, wraps
the session key and the nonce created by obs in SessionKeyMsg and encrypts
it with the public key that belongs to obs. After that the card state is set to
AUTHENTICATED and the session key together with the nonce will be sent
to obs (6). obs receives the message, checks its state, encrypts the message,
compares the nonce, stores the session key, sets its state to AUTHENTICATED
and returns a non-security critical message HandshakeSuccessful (7). The used
messages in this protocol are depicted in Figure 11 and Figure 9.
Figure 7 shows the protocol to transfer money from one account to another
one. After the session key is exchanged and the states are set to AUTHEN-
TICATED, the online transaction can be processed. The account owner (card
holder) has to type in the transaction data, namely the PIN, the amount of
money that should be transferred and the receiver account information. This
data (uoti) will be sent over pc to the card (1). The card checks that the
card state is AUTHENTICATED, wraps uoti and the account information (ac-
countInfo) that is initially stored on the card in the message TransactionData
and encrypts it with the previously exchanged session key. Then the state is
set to IDLE and the encrypted data is sent to obs over the pc (2). After obs
receives the message TransactionData it checks that its state is also AUTHEN-
TICATED and decrypts the received data with the previously exchanged session
key. The state is set back to IDLE to avoid replay attacks and on the basis of
the card holder’s bank code it is checked which bank the card holder account
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Figure 7: Protocol to transfer money from one account to another
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belongs to. Dependent on this the message is sent over the port affiliated to the
affiliated bank (3) or over the port directly to the direct bank (4). The ports
are modelled in the deployment diagram (see Figure 2). If bank b1 receives a
transaction message with PIN, the amount of money that should be transferred,
the sender account information and the receiver account information it checks if
the card holder account belongs to it (5). If so, it checks if the receiver account
also belongs to it and processes the transaction internally (6). Otherwise, the
bank deducts the sum from the card holder account (7) and sends a request to
the bank of the receiver account (8) to increase the sum in its account (9). If
this fails (e.g. because of a non-existent account number) bank b1 is notified,
and the deduction from the card holder account is revoked (10). The failure
(denoted by the flow final) will be propagated back to the user. Otherwise, the
transaction was successful and a message is sent back over obs and pc to the
user (11). But before the notification is sent to the user, pc closes the session
with obs using the stereotype closeSession.
An online transaction between different banks must avoid that money is
deducted from one account but not deposited to another account. For this it
is necessary that the messages during a transaction always arrive in the correct
order. This is guaranteed in our example because the attacker has only the
ability to read messages on the connection between affiliated bank and direct
bank (see Figure 2, with a full Dolev-Yao attacker we cannot ensure that a
protocol ever finishes). Because this connection is secured with Transport Layer
Security (TLS) [6] the attacker can only read the encrypted messages. The used
messages in this protocol are shown in Figure 12 and Figure 9.
In Figure 7 we have seen the use of the superclass Bank in an activity di-
agram. This is very useful to avoid the modelling of redundant behavior and
makes the diagrams clearer. The deployment diagram (see Figure 2) ensures
that if b1 is a DirectBank then b2 is an AffiliatedBank and vice versa. Same
functionality is encapsulated in methods that are predefined or designed in the
model. Methods designed in the model like intraBankTransaction (see Fig-
ure 8), decreaseCardHolderAccountBalance (see Figure 13), increaseReceiver-
AccountBalance (see Figure 14) and handleFailedTransaction (see Figure 15)
allow big and complex protocols to be divided into smaller diagrams, so that all
of them remain clear.
The modelled method intraBankTransaction (see Figure 8) represents a part
of our online transaction protocol that handles the transaction where the card
holder account and the receiver account belong to the same bank. First we
cache some information from the object we have received through the input
parameter and then we check whether the accounts are available in the store
accounts. Then we get the accounts and check if the PIN of that card holder
account is equal to the PIN entered by the user, whether the amount is positive
and make sure that the card holder does not try to transfer more money than
he is allowed to. If it is true, the money will be subtracted from the card holder
account and added to the receiver account. Otherwise nothing will happen and
the method returns false.
13
Figure 8: Sub-Activity IntraBankTransaction
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5 Executable Code
An advantage of SecureMDD compared to some of the other model-driven ap-
proaches (see Section 7) is that runnable code will be generated. To achieve
that, our approach is to model the whole system. That is possible because we
use our own platform independent language (MEL) to describe the behaviour
of the components.
The service components in SecureMDD are implemented as Web Services
that use SOAP [25] as underlying technology. To implement Web Services we
use Metro3 that integrates JAX-WS[23] (Java API for XML - Web Services).
JAX-WS is a standard and supports server and clients as well as the Code-
First principle with plain old Java objects (POJO) which is very important
because we already generate the code. Services will be invoked by stubs that
are automatically generated by the wsimport library, that is a part of JAX-
WS. These stubs manage the communication between client and service, the
mapping between Java objects and XML documents as well as the transmitting
and receiving of XML documents.
To support services that provide a new instance for every invoker, stateful
services that are a part of JAX-WS are used. To communicate with a stateful
service instance, it is necessary to invoke a stateless service that gives the invoker
the address of a stateful service instance. That means every invoker gets a fresh
instance for a session but it does not protect against an attacker who could
invoke that service instance, too.
@WebService
public c lass Af f i l i a t edBank {
private St r ing bankCode ;
private ListOfAccount accounts ;
. . .
public Af f i l i a t edBank ( )
throws java . lang . Exception { . . . }
public Af f i l i a t edBank ( ListOfAccount accounts , S t r ing bankCode )
throws java . lang . Exception { . . . }
@WebMethod
public MessageWrapper proce s s (MessageWrapper msg)
throws Serv i ceExcept ion { . . . }
private Message processMessage (Message inmsg )
throws java . lang . Exception { . . . }
private Message sendMsg (Message msg , int port ,
Boolean openSess ionBeforeSend ,
Boolean c l o s eS e s s i onA f t e rRe c e i v e )
throws java . lang . Exception { . . . }
public void s t a r t S e r v i c e ( ) throws java . lang . Exception { . . . }
public void s t opSe rv i c e ( ) { . . . }
. . .
}
Listing 1: Generated code for AffiliatedBank
Listing 1 depicts the generated class for AffiliatedBank from the Debitcard ex-
ample. The class is annotated as service with @WebService and the methods
3http://metro.java.net/
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that can be called from outside and describe the interface are annotated with
@WebMethod. The class attributes contain the attributes from the class Af-
filiatedBank in the class diagram (see Figure 3) and some technical ones. An
empty and non-empty constructor is generated. The empty one is for JAXB
(JAX-Binding) that is responsible for mapping between code and XML docu-
ments and the non-empty one gets the initialize attributes. The method process
receive incoming messages and invokes processMessage with the message that
is wrapped in the MessageWrapper object. The wrapping is necessary because
JAXB needs a container to transmit an upper class with the information about
its subclass. The processMessage is shown in Listing 2.
private Message processMessage (Message inmsg ) throws java . lang . Exception {
switch ( inmsg . getCode ( ) ) {
case Code .DEBIT :
return proces sDeb i t ( ( Debit ) inmsg ) ;
case Code .TERMINALPAYOUT :
return processTerminalPayOut ( ( TerminalPayOut ) inmsg ) ;
. . .
default :
s top ( ) ;
return null ;
}
}
Listing 2: processMessage from AffilatedBank
Dependent on the message code that describes the subclass, the appropriate
process method is called. For example, for the message Debit the method pro-
cessDebit is called. This method is generated from the swimlane AffiliatedBank
in the activity diagram in Figure 4 and is depicted in Listing 3.
private Message proces sDeb i t ( Debit inmsg ) throws java . lang . Exception {
synchronized ( this ) {
AccountInfo accountIn fo = inmsg . getAccountInfo ( ) ;
UserTransact ionIn fo userTransIn fo = inmsg . getUserTransInfo ( ) ;
i f ( account In fo . getBankCode ( ) . equa l s ( bankCode ) ) {
boolean deb i t Su c c e s s f u l = debitFunct ion ( accountInfo ,
userTransIn fo ) ;
i f ( d eb i t Su c c e s s f u l ) {
int money = userTransIn fo . getMoney ( ) ;
return sendMsg (new TerminalPayOut (money ) ) ;
} else {
stop ( ) ;
return null ;
}
} else {
return sendMsg (new Debit ( accountInfo , userTransIn fo ) ,
Ports . A f f i l i a t edBank2Di r e c tBank de fau l t ) ;
}
}
}
Listing 3: processDebit from AffilatedBank
The generated code is similar to the modelled behaviour and is generated au-
tomatically. To send a message the method sendMsg is called. In Listing 4
the generated send method of AffiliatedBank is shown. This method is called
by every send of a message and encapsulates the different behaviour to send a
message because we support smart card and service communication and need a
central place to manipulate the send messages.
private Message sendMsg (Message msg , int port ) throws java . lang . Exception {
Message response ;
switch ( port ) {
case Ports . A f f i l i a t edBank2Di r e c tBank de fau l t :
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DirectBank directBank = new DirectBankServ ice ( )
. getDirectBankPort ( ) ;
setTimeout ( ( BindingProvider ) directBank ) ;
re sponse = directBank . p roce s s (new MessageWrapper (msg ) ) . getMsg ( ) ;
return processMessage ( response ) ;
default :
s top ( ) ;
return null ;
}
}
Listing 4: Generated code for invoking a service
The AffiliatedBank can only communicate with a DirectBank. That informa-
tion is modelled in the deployment diagram (see Figure 2) and the port Affiliat-
edBank2DirectBank default is generated automatically and describes to which
component a message should be sent. A timeout will be set to avoid that the
invoker trying to connect or send a message infinitely. To invoke a service stubs
are used. Hence, the whole communication between a client and a service can
be accessed through an attribute like in this example directBank. But the stubs
that are generated by wsimport, contain only the class attributes and method
signatures but not the body of the methods. Therefore, only the part that is re-
sponsible for the communication is used. The other part that contains the classes
is deleted and replaced with the classes that are generated by SecureMDD.
Because a service can be concurrently invoked by many clients, parallelism
is an important issue. If a write access to an attribute depends on previously
read attribute, an optimal synchronization is a non trivial task. To manage the
parallelism problem, our first solution is to synchronize the areas between re-
ceiving and sending a message (see Listing 3). The synchronization of a stateful
service is done by a static variable and synchronizes the areas for all instances
of that service. For stateless services it is sufficient to synchronize on the ser-
vice instance self. Because this solution implements the behaviour of our formal
model (see Section 6), dead locks and live locks that influence the security prop-
erties will be identified during the verification. Through this synchronization,
the parallelism problems are solved but any kind of concurrent invocation is
disabled.
To support the functionality to get an object by an identifier we provide
the functions set, get and containsKey on a key-value storage. For example
the accounts in the Debitcard case study are realized with this prototypically
implemented data structure. To deploy that banking system (Debitcard) the
store accounts will be probably realized with a database. Also, the terminals
should be accessible with a graphical user interface (GUI). For that, the key-
value storage implementation is encapsulated in a class that can be replaced by
another implementation and for a GUI we provide a user interface which is used
to notify a GUI when a message is received.
Because during software development requirements can change, it is useful
that code for the modelled applications can be automatically generated and
tested. For that, a test case which initializes all instances, deploys all services
and calls the user messages to execute the protocols has to be created; to deploy
the services we generate the methods startService and stopService for each ser-
vice; this way we can call startService before and stopService after a test case.
In our test framework the services will be deployed on a light-weight server that
is integrated in Java but of course we can also deploy the services on other
servers.
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To test a service application we have to generate stubs for all components
that call services. Hence after all component code is generated, we deploy the
services and generate stubs for every client (either a service or a terminal) on its
local platform. The whole process can be invoked with one click inside Eclipse.
A modelled application consists of different components that will be deployed
in different environments. This influences the service communication because
the generated stubs depend on the service address. In our test environment
all services are deployed on the localhost. If a service is deployed on another
host with a different IP or domain, the stubs of the invoker need to be changed.
To minimize effort and because we want to generate runnable code which must
not be edited, we encapsulate the functionality of stubs generation for each
component in a class which allows setting the IP/domain-address.
TLS uses keys and certificates, thus we need a key and trust store to provide
them. The key store contains asymmetric key pairs while the trust store provides
signed certificates; to use TLS, keys and certificates have to be transferred inside
a secure environment before the system can be deployed.
For Debitcard, the full generated and runnable code can be found on our
website4.
6 Formal Verification
An important aspect of the SecureMDD approach is the support for the for-
mal verification of security properties of a system under development. This is
achieved by the automatic generation of a formal model that is suitable for our
interactive theorem prover KIV [13, 1, 10]. The formal model is based on alge-
braic specifications and Abstract State Machines (ASMs) [3]. It specifies a world
in which agents exchange messages according to the protocols, and an attacker
tries to break the security. Agents are either users, smart cards, terminals, or
services, and there exists an arbitrary (finite) number of agents. In this world
protocol runs between arbitrary agents take place that may happen in parallel
or consecutively. The idea is that the formal model models the real world where
many users use ATMs or perform online banking at the same time. One step of
the ASM corresponds to one protocol step (receiving and processing a message),
a run of the ASM creates a trace, i.e. a sequence of steps, that describes one
possibility of what can happen in this world. Since the ASM is indeterministic
it models not one but many traces. The idea is that the ASM models everything
that can happen in the real world (with respect to the application). So if the
application can be proved secure in the formal model it should be secure in the
real world. More details can be found in [19]. In the following we will describe
only how services are modelled formally.
6.1 Transport Layer Security and the Attacker
In Section 4 we have shown that security stereotypes for connections like Trans-
portLayerSecurity influence the stereotype Threat. If an attacker has the abili-
ties to read, send, and suppress messages (i.e. a Dolev-Yao attacker [7] for this
connection) and the connection is secured with TLS, the attacker loses some of
those abilities. Because TLS is a secure protocol we use some of its security
4http://www.informatik.uni-augsburg.de/lehrstuehle/swt/se/projects/secureMDD/
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properties [6]. Messages are encrypted with a session key, their integrity is en-
sured by a message authentication code (MAC), and a sequence number is used
to detect missing or replayed messages. If an error is detected the connection is
closed.
This means the attacker can only read messages that are encrypted with a
prior exchanged session key that will never be used in another session. There-
fore reading the messages is useless for the attacker because they cannot be
used for replays (as described below) and we are only concerned with logical
security properties, not traffic analysis where the message length or timing may
be important.
Furthermore, in the formal model the attacker loses his ability to send mes-
sages, because if the message is not encrypted with the correct session key (which
the attacker does not possess) the MAC verification will fail and the message
will not be accepted. A replayed message is encrypted with the correct session
key, but will not be accepted because of the sequence number. The ability to
suppress messages is lost as well because the next message will have an incor-
rect sequence number. However, the attacker has the ability to terminate the
connection as described above.
To summarize, it is appropriate to formalize a TLS secured connection as
one where an attacker can either do nothing or can only abort the connection
(depending on the annotations in the deployment diagram Figure 2).
6.2 Stateful and Stateless Services as Agents
A service component can be stateless or stateful. Both must be treated slightly
different in the formal model. A stateless service is similar to other agents like
terminals and smart cards. The formal model may have an arbitrary number
of services or it may be restricted to exactly one.
A stateful service however creates an instance of itself for each invoker. The
actual code of the invoker calls a manager which is also implemented as a state-
less service. It creates an instance of the actual service, deploys it and returns
the address of this service instance. This behavior is not modelled in the UML
model of the application, and it is not reflected in the formal specification be-
cause it is an implementation issue only and does not change the modelled
behavior or the security aspects of the modelled application. Thus, only the
address of the service is transmitted which is not a security-critical information
leak because the attacker already knows all components in the formal model.
For one stateful service the formal model has an arbitrary number of agents
that represent the different new instances of the same service. They all have
the same initial attributes that are reset with every connection establishment.
Thus a stateful service is modeled as a set of agents that can be handled as the
other agent types.
6.3 Verification of Security Properties
Beside the automatic code generation, the verification of security properties
for the generated applications is a major benefit for the development of secure
systems. With this approach we do not have to guess whether the application
is secure, since we were able to formally verify it.
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Usually only generic properties like secrecy or authentication are proven
for security protocols (see [22] for an overview). In contrast, the SecureMDD
approach focuses on application specific security properties [20]. They give
better confidence in the properties of the application as a whole. In the bank
application from Section 4 it is interesting to know that PINs and session keys
remain secret, but the real properties are about money. For example, the bank
application has the property that the amount of money remains constant in the
following sense:
The sum of all account balances plus the amount of all the money
that has been withdrawn from cash machines is unchanged in all
runs of the Abstract State Machine (ASM).
The proof works by proving an invariant for every step of the ASM. It turns
out the property stated above is not quite correct because not yet finished proto-
col runs must be taken into account. For example, during an online transaction
(see Figure 7) there is a situation where one account has been debited, but the
receiver not yet credited. In a sense, the money is contained in the message
between the different banks, and must be included in the money count. So the
actual property written as a Hoare triple (and slightly simplified) is:
money = ATMMoney(atms)
+ DirectBankMoney(accounts)
+ AffiliatedBankMoney(accounts)
+ MoneyInTransit(messages) →
{ ASM(messages, atms, accounts, ...) }
money = ATMMoney(atms)
+ DirectBankMoney(accounts)
+ AffiliatedBankMoney(accounts)
+ MoneyInTransit(messages)
This property is proved formally with the KIV system. The main difficulty
is to specify MoneyInTransit correctly. If during a proof attempt it turns out
that the specification is not correct, it must be modified, and the proofs must
done again. This can happen even if the protocol is secure.
To verify that security property it was also necessary to consider different
kinds of connections. The connection between terminal and smartcard is in-
herently unreliable because a user can whip the card out of the reader at any
time. In a more general setting, other types of connections should be supported.
In the debitcard application, the connections between ATM and AffiliatedBank
as well as between AffiliatedBank and DirectBank should not be disconnected
before the protocol is finished. Otherwise money can be lost and the mentioned
security property does not hold. For that we specified the critical connections
as not disconnect-able.
7 Related Work
There are some approaches related to our SecureMDD that differ in certain as-
pects. For example UMLSec developed by Jan Ju¨rjens [12] as well as SecureUML
by David Basin et. al. [2] are both approaches to develop security-critical sys-
tems with extended UML by using an UML profile. SecureUML is tailored to
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role-based access control applications and additionally supports specific autho-
rization constraints with OCL. UMLSec allows to express security properties
like secrecy, integrity and role-based access control with stereotypes. Both con-
sider only standard security properties that can be proved with a model checker
or automated theorem prover whereas we are able to prove application specific
properties. Furthermore, both do not generate executable code. In contrast
the SecureUML approach generates access control infrastructures for Enterprise
JavaBeans.
MDD4SOA developed by Mayer et. al. [15] is a model-driven approach for
service orchestration that transforms a platform independent model into several
platform specific models and those to code for the languages BPEL, WSDL, Java
and the formal language Jolie. It uses its own UML profile (UML4SOA [14]) to
provide the modelling of service-oriented architectures and also verify properties
with the formal language Jolie. But it does not consider security-critical pro-
tocols and does not define a language like our MEL to describe actions. They
also do not generate executable code.
Another approach developed by Deubler et al. [5] considers the development
of security-critical service-oriented systems. For modelling and verification it
uses the tool AUTOFOCUS [11] that provides an own modelling language sim-
ilar to UML. The considered security mechanisms are authentication and au-
thorization that are proved with a model checker.
We are not aware of an approach like ours that provides model-driven devel-
opment for security-critical systems that consider services, terminals and smart
cards, generates executable code and verifies application specific security prop-
erties for a modelled system.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
Many security-critical systems consist of components that interact with each
other over a network to perform tasks together. A common standard to imple-
ment this are Web Services. In this paper we have presented an enhancement
of our SecureMDD approach to consider secure service application. Now we
are able to model secure service and smart card applications and automatically
generate runnable code as well as prove application specific security properties.
With services the communication structure is enhanced greatly. Every kind of
component has to be handled in a special way. Services are realized as SOAP
Web Services and can be stateless or stateful. Connections to services can be
secured with a predefined stereotype TLS as well as with application spe-
cific protocols. With a banking system named Debitcard we demonstrated the
abilities of our SecureMDD approach.
The next steps are to support WS-Security to include concepts like Kerberos
or SAML and use a standard that is readable by other services that are not cre-
ated by our approach. We also will handle parallelism in a more efficient way,
integrate a real database and extend our communication structure. Further-
more we will support OCL expressions to define security properties within the
platform independent model for the formal verification and integrate an existing
model checker.
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A Diagrams for Debitcard
Figure 9: User Messages
Figure 10: Messages for withdrawal of money from an ATM
Figure 11: Messages for the handshake protocol
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Figure 12: Messages for online transaction
Figure 13: Sub-Activity to decrease card holder account balance
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Figure 14: Sub-Activity to increase card holder account balance
Figure 15: Sub-Activity to handle a failed transaction
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